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ABSTRACT 
 
Today’s complex sociopolitical context features an increasing determent of 
fundamental bipartisan principles and negotiation at both the federal and state levels of 
government. A competitive political environment akin to post-Civil War times, amplified 
by growing partisan polarization and politicians’ quest for party allegiance and self-
reward, pervasively discourages productive compromising efforts to work across the isle. 
We believe this hinders government’s sole and rather straightforward fiscal duty: to 
provide stable, healthy, and predictable economic conditions for its constituents. Credit 
ratings offer a window into the interaction of public policy, political uncertainty, and 
economic performance, which all lie at the nucleus of the political economy. Present 
literature provides a variety of studies concerning the adverse economic effects of 
partisan gridlock on fiscal efforts. Very few, however, go so far as to specifically 
examine this at the state level, let alone the inaugural political realm for many of today’s 
congressional members: the state house. 
 We reference previously successful models similar to this nature and uniquely 
construct a polychotomous ordinal dependent variable for several multinomial ordered 
probit models. These models seek to explain the economic side effects of three indicators 
of political instability: state government competitiveness, polarization in the lower house, 
and party control in the lower house. We conclude substantial insignificance for two out 
of the three indicators, primarily due to the structure of our dependent variable. Our 
analysis also provides evidence that, on average, Republican control of the lower house 
increases the chances of a higher credit rating and economic stability within a given state.
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“There is an unavoidable fact about legislating in a democratic system. No single person, 
faction, or interest can get everything it wants. Legislating inevitably means 
compromising, except in the rare circumstances when consensus is so strong that one 
dominant view can prevail with ease.” 
 
– Robert Kaiser 2013, pp. 174 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Today’s complex sociopolitical context features an increasing determent of 
fundamental bipartisan principles and negotiation at both the federal and state levels of 
government. The American system – separation of powers, bicameralism, and all – is 
unique to any other government infrastructure in the world in that it requires an 
intentional but extraordinary level of consensus to pass new legislation1, a process that 
partisan gridlock only makes less efficient. Given today’s poignant government role in 
virtually every capacity of the economy, this political phenomenon poses a substantial 
and growing risk to the economic stability of a government’s constituency. Before 
exploring its exact ramifications, we first need to look at what gridlock looks like and 
what causes it. 
 
1. Partisan Gridlock in the U.S. Congress 
The United States Congress serves as the arena of American democracy; a place 
where senators and representatives have come together for centuries to passionately 
discuss solutions to our nation’s most pressing issues. It is the heart and soul of our 
federal political infrastructure and the exclusive domain where citizens bind their closest 
connection to the federal government. The bimodal body’s constant rotation of 535 
members from 435 distinct districts and 50 unique states has beckoned uninterrupted 
ridicule in support of Zelizer (2004)’s modern impression: “an amorphous, messy, and 
chaotic body […] [full of] corrupt individuals and crooked interest groups.” In order to 
prevent what the Founders called a “mischief of faction,” they intuitively designed such a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Krehbiel (1999). 
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structure to preserve the status quo and bring out the best – and only the best – of societal 
consensus. Even so, the difficulty of passage has grown to a gross, unnecessary 
magnitude that has debilitated our national economy and contributed to one of the 
slowest economic recoveries in our nation’s history. 
Only recently has gridlock become a warranted occurrence for those in Congress. 
The body fluctuated from extreme fragmentation to strong partisan centralization starting 
the late 1970s2. Optimistic approaches to end growing partisanship, like reforms to 
reduce filibusters, were unsuccessful. In the mid-1980s, “party leaders replaced 
committee chairs as the center of decision-making in the House and the Senate” (Zelizer, 
2004, p. 618), making each party more or less homogenous ideologically. Southern 
conservative Democrats diminished, GOP moderates became almost extinct, and both 
parties shifted to their left and right, respectively. By the late 1980s, there was clear 
evidence that congressional polarization had begun. House Speaker Jim Wright (D-
Texas) threatened to have Chairman of Ways and Means Dan Rostenkowski (D-Ill.) 
removed from his position for publishing a newspaper article that criticized a Democratic 
tax initiative. A young Republican representative from Georgia, Newt Gingrich, publicly 
blasted party member and president, George H. W. Bush, after Bush agreed to a tax 
increase in 1990. This was just the beginning to a now obvious national embarrassment3. 
 According to Zelizer (2004), congressional majorities offer a concrete basis for 
analyzing gridlock because of data availability and measurement simplicity. Since the 
92nd Congress (1971-1973), the average Senate majority has been 9.8 senators – half the 
average of the period between the 57th United States Congress (1901-1903) and the 92nd 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Zelizer (2004). 
3 Welna (2013). 
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Congress (19.4 senators). A similar trend can be observed in the House of 
Representatives, where the average majority since the 92nd Congress (66.9 members) is 
also smaller than the average majority up until 1971 (79.5 members). 
 Nearly every federal election cycle since the 1970s has narrowly held out the 
possibility of an institutional shift in partisan control. We live in a political era that’s 
reminiscent of the Gilded Age (1876-1896) – a time when alternating party majorities, 
close elections, and ferocious party conflict (Binder and Lee, 2013) hinged on issues of 
social conflict and states’ rights following a civil war that nearly ripped apart the nation. 
Despite the era’s rapid economic growth due to industrialization and an immigrant labor 
force, this isn’t exactly the political comparison we should be proud of. 
  
2. Partisan Polarization Pathology: Cause and Effect 
The causes of partisan polarization are not straightforward, which makes the 
phenomena both difficult to measure and remedy. The general public seems to believe 
that the cause lies somewhere between the amount of money in the current political 
system and gerrymandering4, yet academics are still speculating whether campaign 
finance corruption is a significant factor. They also claim only ten to fifteen percent of 
increased polarization can be attributed to the redrawing of congressional districts 
(Hetherington, 2012). Perhaps it’s the general public itself postulating polarization’s 
existence. Pew’s (2012) study shows that the average partisan gap amongst citizens has 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 McDonald and Grofman (1999) and Carson, Crespin, Finocchiaro, and Rohde (2003). 
  4 
nearly doubled over a twenty-five-year period – from ten percentage points in 1987 to 18 
percentage points in 2012 – yet many are still critical of their respective party’s work5 
 
Cultural Polarization. Social psychology’s morality principle tells us that our 
ethics and fundamental distinction between what is right and wrong binds us into like-
minded groups. Like Pew (2012), Bishop (2008) finds finds that Americans have been 
residentially segregating themselves by political party over the past thirty years. With 
heterogeneity and political coexistence quickly becoming a thing of the past, like-minded 
groups have assumed a disregard of objective reality and increased polarity. These groups 
become more extreme than any one individual within it. This is an unfortunate since 
humans are the species on the planet that have the intellectual capacity for large-scale 
cooperation without a need for kinship (Haidt 2012; Orzag 2012). 
Other scholars attribute gridlock to the realignment of Southern politics6, others to 
increasing economic and social inequality7, or party-enhancing legislative reforms8. 
Barone (2001) points to growing religious and cultural divides as the polarizer and 
instigator of a more passionate and heated political discourse. Fiorina (2005) challenges 
this conventional wisdom by arguing an “inside the beltway” phenomenon is taking 
place. From this perspective, the mass isn’t polarized at all; it is closely divided, but not 
deeply divided. Fiorina and others9 maintain that political moderation and pragmatism is 
only at risk at the elite level; yet state legislatures have polarized as well (roughly two-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Pew’s (2012) data claims that nearly 71 percent of Republicans and 58 percent of Democrats say that have 
not stood up for their traditional positions. 
6 McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal (1997; 2003); Perlstein (2002); Stonecash, Brewer and Mariani (2003). 
7 McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal (1997; 2003); Stonecash, Brewer, and Mariani (2003); Hicks (2003); 
Rosenthal (n.d.). 
8 Rohde (1991); Synder and Grosclose (1999). 
9 Hetherington (2001) and McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal (2003). 
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thirds of them10). Such polarization implies a fundamental structural problem at the mass 
level. 
Scholars have paid attention to gridlock’s rather intuitive effects on sociopolitical 
elements like the level of trust in government and public policy outcomes; however, 
virtually none have focused specifically on its effect on economic stability in U.S. states. 
 
3. Partisan Gridlock in the States: An Empirical Analysis 
One of Congress’ most recent debacles was the debt ceiling standoff in 2011 that 
rattled markets and resulted in a S&P (Standard and Poor’s) downgrade of the 
government’s AAA credit rating11,12. This political impasse proved that gridlock 
unequivocally poses potential risk to securing fiscal policy and thus economic stability. 
This ascertains the primary motivation of our empirical work and hypothesis: does 
gridlock – characterized by competitiveness, dividedness, and party control – pose a 
similar risk for the U.S. states? 
Both Poterba (1994) and Alt and Lowry (1994) show that increased propensity for 
gridlock in state legislatures can pose significant consequences for policy outcomes. This 
is especially apparent when responding to economic shocks, because of the need for 
additional (a) political bargaining, and (b) heightened disagreement over appropriate 
responses. 
Pallay’s (2014) recent study shows the division of state governments in real 
numbers. From 1992-2013, the average state government was divided over half the time 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Orzag (2012). 
11 Lawder (2013). 
12 This alone broadly justifies the economic significance between the relationship of partisan polarization 
and economic condition. We will attempt to provide an argument for statistical significance through 
empirical analysis. 
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(57.2 percent), while Republican (24.9 percent) or Democratic trifecta13 (22.4 percent) 
characterized the remaining composition. Over the same period, the average state 
legislature was divided nearly one-quarter of the time (23.3 percent), while Democrats 
(41.1 percent) and Republicans (35.6 percent) controlled the rest14. Democrats controlled 
state houses for 53.5 percent of the time, while Republicans held the lower chambers for 
44.8 percent of the time. 
This represents just a portion of the literature pertaining to the study of gridlock at 
the U.S. state level and we hope to add to it by studying this intriguing relationship. In 
order to empirically consider gridlock using congressional bodies, our analysis requires 
more than one observation (the U.S. Congress), and thus, we turn to state governments. 
This comes at a cost, however. Since each sate government is economically unique, its 
controlling political parties hold unequal ideologies (i.e. Massachusetts Democrats vs. 
Mississippi Democrats). Its governments also consider drastically different policies that 
seek to remedy drastically different political and economic issues15.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 A trifecta refers to a particular time when one party controls the governorship and both chambers of the 
state’s legislature (Pallay 2014). 
14 The most competitive state legislatures have been Delaware, Nevada, and New York, while the most 
noncompetitive legislatures have been Hawaii (D), Idaho (R), Maryland (D), Massachusetts (D), Rhode 
Island (D), Utah (R), West Virginia (D), and Wyoming (R) (Pallay 2014). 
15 Shor (2014). 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND SCOPE 
 
1. Measurements of Economic Stability 
Economic stability in the U.S. states is difficult to measure. The existing 
literature, its various units of measurement, and proposed strategies fortify this 
observation. 
Pallay (2014) explores the correlation16 between partisan control and a state’s 
economic performance, proxied by a “state quality-of-life” (SQLI) metric. This index 
includes the following ranked indicators17:  
state credit ratings; 
governance ranking18; 
employment/unemployment19; 
high school graduation rates20; 
poverty rates21; 
personal income per capita22; 
real GDP per capita23; 
state government spending to GDP24; 
state and local tax burden25; 
and unfunded pension liabilities due per capita26. 
He uses an ordinary least squares (OLS) bivariate regression to find correlations between 
state economic performance rankings and partisan control. He then introduces multiple 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Pallay (2014) emphasizes repeatedly that the trends in the data are intended to describe correlation not 
causation, however they do provide some insight  
17 Pallay (2014) uses varying weights for theses and doesn’t seem to address exactly how these weights 
originated or how they affect his analysis. The reasoning behind these different weights is heavily 
influential in his results. 
18 Badenhausen (2013); Cohn (2013); Donlon (2013); Sauter et al. (2013). 
19 BLS (2013); BLS and DOL (2014). 
20 UHF (2013). 
21 Census and BLS (2012). 
22 BEA (2013). 
23 Woodford and Wang (2013). 
24 Woodford and Wang (2013). 
25 Tax (2014). 
26 Eucalitto (2014). 
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fixed-effects probit regressions27, using a dependent variable of state quality-of-life 
ranking for each year, and both contemporaneous and lagged independent ranking of 
overall partisanship. 
Arnett’s (2014) method draws on an approach laid out by Groves, Godsey, and 
Shulman (1981). Using fiscal year 2012, he creates “cash, budget, long-run, and service-
level solvency indices to measure the dimensions of [a state’s] fiscal condition.” The cash 
solvency component reflects the government’s liquidity, overall cash-management, and 
ability to pay interest payments on time. Budget solvency concerns the government’s 
ability to avoid deficits by meeting revenue with spending obligations. Long-run 
solvency represents the government’s capacity to address all of its costs, including long-
term obligations like pensions. Service-level solvency is determined by a number of 
short- and long-run factors, including the size of the state’s revenue base. Her model 
seeks to describe a state government’s ability to meet financial and service obligations, 
much like credit ratings, but instead a “transparent and nuanced measure” (Arnett, 2014). 
 
Credit Ratings. Credit ratings offer an independently opinionated, yet credible, 
measurement of a state’s economic stability and outlook in a given year. More 
specifically, credit ratings of general obligation bonds (GBO) are based on the ability and 
willingness of an issuer, such as a state government, “to meet its financial obligations in 
full and on time28” (S&P, 2011, p. 3). Three rating agencies dominate the credit rating 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 The ranking form of Pallay (2014)’s SQLI index severely restricts the analytical power of a series 
regression using panel data. 
28 For reasonable protection against criticism, credit agencies like S&P (2011) claim that market 
participants who are using ratings for investment and business decisions can’t fully rely on them since the 
ratings don’t explicitly guarantee repayment or no default. We adopt this notion as well, in that because our 
analysis is dependent on the plethora of different opinions analyzing such credit risks, we can’t ultimately 
guarantee a completely unbiased dependent variable. 
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market and provide the majority of GBO ratings: Standard and Poor’s, Fitch, and 
Moody’s. Since all are evenly well-established rating options, there are several 
approaches that seek to converge the three. 
Depken and LaFountain (2006) and Schelker (2009; 2012) simulate economic 
performance and stability with the construction of a single credit rating measure based on 
ratings from the three principal rating agencies (S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch). After 
assigning a quantitative categorical measure to each rating29, the numerical rating for 
state 𝑖 in year 𝑡 by rating agency 𝑗 is 𝑅!"# ∈ 1,… ,𝑁! , where 1 refers to the highest GOB 
rating and 𝑁! the lowest rating by agency 𝑗. Next, scores 𝑅!"# are normalized by dividing 
them by the number of possible rating, 𝑁!, for each rating agency 𝑗 𝑅′!"# = 𝑅!"#/𝑁! . 
The scores are then averaged to obtain a normalized overall rating 𝑅′!"# for each state 𝑖 in 
year 𝑡. We follow a similar approach in constructing our dependent variable in an attempt 
to incorporate the varying degrees of analysis conducted by each agency. 
Significant issues with data arise when considering the difference in analyses by 
each of the three rating agencies. Ammar et al. (2001) observe that S&P typically relies 
on economic factors such as employment, income growth, income inequality, and 
poverty, while Moody’s and Fitch consider factors like fiscal policies and institutional 
considerations. Additionally, the analytical weight delegated to each factor relies on the 
analysts’ judgment30. These factors change overtime31 and some factors are only 
considered in specific states32 (e.g. tourism in Maine). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Depken and LaFountain (2006) change the sign on these measures to negative in order to provide a more 
intuitive interpretation of the regression results.  We find it easier to leave the categorical measures as is 
and account for this accordingly in our interpretation of the model’s estimates. 
30 Jewell and Livingston (1999). 
31 Uyar and Escarraz (1995); Ammar et al. (2001). 
32 Ammar et al. (2001). 
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Most agencies carry out a number of precautions33 to avoid conflicts of interest, 
since the issuer typically pays the agency to rate their issuances. One clear bias arises 
when considering the lack of a diversity within the credit rating agency industry, where 
S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch account for somewhere between 90 to 96 percent of all 
outstanding financial obligation ratings34. Although the three agencies disagree at times, 
they are generally very close to each other in consensus; thus we believe our approach to 
aggregating ratings like Depken and LaFountain (2006) won’t present any significant risk 
of bias.  
Fehr (2012) provides clear insight into the relationship between a state’s 
economic environment and its credit rating by studying S&P ratings from 2001-2012. His 
work concludes that rating upgrades (or downgrades) can be attributed to positive (or 
negative) changes in a particular state’s economy. For example, Massachusetts improved 
from AA- in 2001 to AA+ in 2012 by diversifying its manufacturing sector. Louisiana 
improved from A in 2001 to AA in 2012 because of an infusion of federal dollars 
following the Hurricane Katrina relief effort. Conversely, Michigan’s shrinking auto 
industry brought its AAA rating in 2001 down to AA- in 2012. California’s continued 
struggle to balance its budget (following strict tax limits in 1978) saw its credit rating fall 
from A+ in 2001 to A- in 2012. 
Credit ratings capture a host of economic indicators of stability and risk35. 
Scholars have used ratings to try and extrapolate these indictors, which include: 
annual government finance figures3637;  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 For S&P (2011), these safeguards include physical separation between the analysts and personnel who 
negotiate business terms (similar to newspapers’ editorial and advertising functions) and an extensive 
committee review and assessment procedure. 
34 White (2013). 
35 Ingram, Brooks, and Copeland (1983). 
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political market indicators38; 
fiscal transparency39; 
political turnover40; 
corruption41; 
new debt interest costs42; 
and levels of debt43. 
Debt plays an essential role in establishing credit ratings. This is because state 
governments need access to debt in order to hedge fluctuations of tax revenues over the 
course of one or more fiscal years. Such flexibility allows governments to meet short-
term and long-term expenditure obligations. A state government’s cost of borrowing 
credit has a significant impact on a state’s fiscal health or condition. Perceived risk of 
default accompanies a government’s ability to repay the debt’s principal and interest44, 
and when the risk of default is high, credit ratings are worse. We make sure to include a 
measure debt in our analysis to account for this established relationship. 
 
2. Measurements of Political Stability 	  
Competitiveness and Divided Government. A central research topic within the 
study of state politics has been the degree to which state political systems exhibit 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 For examples, see the following: Aronson and Marsden (1980); Parry (1983); Sharp (1986); Bahl and 
Duncombe (1993); Clingermayer and Wood (1995); and Lowry and Alt (2001). 
37 Indictors include such things as debt to revenue, expenditures to population, intergovernmental aid as a 
proportion of total revenue, and the existence of budget deficits (Krueger and Walker 2008). 
38 Perry and Robertson (1998). 
39 Arbatli and Escolano (2012). 
40 Krueger and Walker (2008). 
41 Depken and LaFountain (2006). 
42 Johnson and Kriz (2005). 
43 Liu and Thankor (1984); Clingermayer and Wood (1995); Uyar and Escarraz (1995); Kiewiet and 
Szakaly (1996); Ellis and Schansber (1999). 
44 Stallman, Deller, Amiel, and Maher (2012). 
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competitiveness, from the consequences of varying levels, to how to measure it45. Taken 
together, the literature presents the notion that political institutions with more frequent 
changes in party control (i.e. divided or more competitive) pose an adverse effect to 
budget and legislative outcomes (although some scholars conclude otherwise46). 
Holbrook and Van Dunk (1993) offer the literature’s first applicable 
measurements by focusing on electoral competitiveness through average margins of 
victories in legislative elections. A district level measure (K. E. Klarner, personal 
communication, March 19, 2014) called the Ranney index47 offers a similar approach, but 
adds a slight complexity by using four separate components: 
a. the proportion of legislative seats Democrats held in a state’s senate;  
b. the proportion of legislative seats Democrats held in a state’s lower 
house;  
c. the proportion of votes attained by the Democratic candidate for 
governor in the last gubernatorial election;  
d. the average number years Democrats have controlled all three 
components (senate, house, and governorship) over the time period to 
which the indicator is being constructed for. 
  
The Ranney index has been utilized as an explanatory measure of political 
competitiveness for analyses attempting to explain various state political and economic 
phenomena. These topics include:  
welfare policy48; 
budget amounts49; 
organizational strength of state parties50; 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Examples include: Alt and Lowry (1994); Anderson, Lassen and Nielsen (2010); Binder (1999); Bohn 
and Inman (1994; 1996); Clarke 1998; Clingermayer and Wood (1995); Conley (2002); Cummins (2012); 
Klarner, Phillips, and Muckler (2010); Kousser (2010); McCubbins (1991); Mayhew (2005); Poterba 
(1994; 1996); and Poterba and Rueben (1999). 
46  Gilligan and Matsusaka (1995; 2001). 
47 Ranney and Kendall (1954); Ranney (1965) 
48 Carmines (1974); Dawson and Robinson (1963). 
49 Sharkansky (1968); Cnudde and McCrone (1969). 
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lobbyist regulation, diversity, density, and mobilization51; 
policy liberalism52; 
child support enforcement53; 
bureaucracy54; 
and partisan composition, competitiveness, and gridlock55 
Not the strongest of measurements, the index poses a host of potential problems if 
used as an overall measurement of competitiveness. This includes an oversimplification 
of four distinctly unique components. Klarner’s (2009) provides a felicitous example of 
this. Suppose that Democrats control 67 percent the senate; they also control 51 percent 
of the lower house; the last gubernatorial election saw the Democratic candidate attain 70 
percent of the vote; and Democrats have held power in all three institutions, 
continuously, over the past six years. This situation would return a Ranney index score of 
0.72, the same scores as a different situation in which Democrats control both legislative 
chambers by 59 percent. The later is much different than the former and poses a 
significantly biased measure of a state’s political competitiveness. 
The index’s fourth component poses a similar inconsistency. Again, Klarner 
(2009) provides a relevant example. Republicans hold the state senate, Democrats hold 
the state house, and there is a Democrat governor over a four-year period. This may seem 
like a less competitive circumstance than a situation where party control of both the 
senate and the house switches in the middle of the period and the party of the governor is 
still Democratic; but the Ranney index score for both circumstances is identical. In 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Cotter et al. (1984). 
51 Opheim (1991); Lowery and Gray (1998); Lowery, Gray, Anderson, and Newark (1998); Berkman 
(2001). 
52 Jackson (1992). 
53 Keiser and Meier (1996). 
54 Huber, Shipman, Pfahler (2001). 
55 Bowling and Ferguson (2001); Klarner (2009); Stallman, Deller, Amiel and Maher (2012). 
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addition, the index’s four components measure separate, unsystematic proportions (i.e. 
one measures party control, while another measures electoral margins). 
 
Partisan Ideology and Polarization. As with political competitiveness and 
divided government, researchers have also studied the effects of another political 
phenomena: the distances between legislators’ ideologies. Numerous studies have argued 
that this “polarization” plays a significant role in creating budget gridlock and political 
instability56. 
Poole and Rosenthal (1984)57 offer a multidimensional scaling measure called 
NOMINATE58, that when dynamically manipulated and weighted (DW-NOMINATE), 
ranks ideological homogeneity based on the distance between parties. The measure 
analyzes individual voting behavior and preferences to infer degrees of polarization. 
Since data isn’t readily available for state legislators over a long period of time, the DW-
NOMINATE method can only be used when analyzing polarization at the federal level 
(Congress59) and not state governments. 
Shor and McCarthy (2011; 2013) offer an alterative approach to measuring 
polarization at the state level. Their research seeks to explain how trends in state 
legislatures are similar in many respects to Congress, but vary in terms of ideological 
spread and pace of polarization. Their method starts by formalizing McCarty, Poole, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Binder (1999); Clarke (1998); Cummins (2012); Kousser (2010); Masket (2007). 
57 Poole and Rosenthal (1984; 1997); McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal (1997). 
58 An acronym for “Nominal Three-Step Estimation.” 
59 For an example of such an analysis, see Theriault (2008); Layman, Carsey, and Horowitz (2006); and 
Thomson (2010). 
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Rosenthal’s (2009) two distinctions of polarization (intradistrict divergence60 and 
sorting61). They calculate the difference in mean ideological points as 
 𝐸 𝑥 𝑅 − 𝐸 𝑥 𝐷 =       𝐸 𝑥 𝑅,𝓏 𝑝 𝓏𝑝 − 𝐸 𝑥 𝐷,𝓏 1− 𝑝 𝓏1− 𝑝 𝑓 𝓏 𝑑𝓏, (1) 
where 𝑥 is an ideological point62; 𝑅 and 𝐷 indicate what party the representative is from; 𝓏 is a vector of district characteristics63, which is distributed according to the density 
function 𝑓; 𝑝 𝓏  represents the probability that a district with characteristics 𝓏 is 
Republican; and 𝑝 represents the average probability of electing a Republican. The 
average ideological difference between a Republican and Democrat who represent a 
district with characteristics 𝓏 is 𝐸 𝑥 𝑅,𝓏 − 𝐸 𝑥 𝐷,𝓏 . This captures intradistrict 
divergence, while 𝑝 𝓏  captures the sorting effect. When there is a no sorting effect, 𝑝 𝓏 = 𝑝 for all 𝓏, so that 
 𝐸 𝑥 𝑅 − 𝐸 𝑥 𝐷 =    𝐸 𝑥 𝑅,𝓏 − 𝐸 𝑥 𝐷,𝓏 𝑓 𝓏 𝑑𝓏. (2) 
The right side of Equation (2) represents the average intradistrict divergence component 
(AIDD) of polarization between the parties. When making cross-state comparisons, Shor 
and McCarty (2011) use a ratio of AIDD to total polarization, which “captures the 
amount of polarization that can be attributed to [ideological] divergence64.” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal (2009) define intradistrict divergence as the difference between how 
Republican and Democratic legislators would represent the same district (Shor and McCarty 2011). 
61 McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal (2009) define the remainder of the polarization measure (or sorting 
effect) as the propensity for Republicans to represent conservative districts and Democrats to represent 
Democratic ones (Shor and McCarty 2011). 
62 Ideal points are estimated by the Project Vote Smart National Political Awareness Test (NPAT) (a survey 
that measures a candidate’s self-assessed ideology), and supplemented by roll call voting data (Shor and 
McCarty 2011). 
63 Characteristics include presidential vote, median family income, poverty rate, percentage of African-
Americans and Hispanics, percentage of college graduates, and percentage of renters. 
64 We utilize this measure in Equations (8) and (11) using Shor and McCarty (2013) data. 
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Their results reveal that intradistrict divergence accounts for a much larger 
proportion of legislative polarization at the state level, than it does in Congress. They also 
discover that California is by far the most polarized state legislature65, while Rhode 
Island66 and Louisiana67 are the least polarized. Overall, states are distributed fairly 
evenly around congressional polarization68. Roughly half are more polarized and some 
are less polarized. On average, Republicans have been getting extreme more rapidly than 
Democrats.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 California is a unique case in which it is so polarized, but controlled predominately by one party. 
Democrats enjoy so much control that polarization’s typical effects of gridlock, stalemate, and instability 
are obsolete – the party has no obstacle to actual lawmaking in the legislature (Shor 2014). 
66 In Rhode Island, most Democrats and Republicans are considered liberal (Shor and McCarty 2011). 
67 Conversely, in Louisiana, most Democrats and Republicans are considered conservative (Shor and 
McCarty 2011). 
68 This confirms that state legislatures are an adequate proxy for Congress in this analysis.  
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III. METHODOLOGY AND APPROACH 
 
 The influence of political instability and gridlock is notably absent in the study of 
bond ratings, except in the few cases of work such as Krueger and Walker (2008), 
Cheung (2008), Loviscek and Crowley (1990). Our main intention is to add as much 
commentary to the relationship as possible in order to propagate more evaluation and 
analysis into this most imperative topic. The following section provides insight into our 
overall process of finding data, constructing variables, and formulating models that best 
support our empirical hypothesis. 
1. Data 	  
Dependent Variable (RATING). We construct our baseline model around a 
dependent variable, RATING, which represents a panel data of long-term69 state general 
obligation bond ratings from 1992 to 20107071. We collected data primarily from Prunty 
and Sugden (2014), Moody’s (2014) 72, and Fitch (2013)73, recording the standing rating74 
for every applicable state in each year of the period. Inapplicable7576 states include 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Outstanding long-term debt accounted for the majority (99.3 percent) of total outstanding debt incurred 
by states in 2007 (Stallman, Deller, Amiel, Maher 2012), which gives us reason to believe that long-term 
bond ratings provide a better measurement than short-term bond ratings. 
70 Additional data was made available but sample periods were constrained by the model’s explanatory 
variables and their respective data ranges. We believed it was important to compile as much data for as 
many years as possible in order to overcome any time-related biases. 
71 This study observes a wider range than any seen in present literature. 
72 Some ratings were redefined due to the introduction of modifiers and some were recalibrated to global 
scale from municipal finance scale (Moody’s 2014). 
73 Physical U.S. Census reports from each year of the period were used to confirm all ratings and to fill in 
any missing values. 
74 Not simply rating changes or reevaluations. 
75 States were deemed inapplicable if they had no or insufficient GOB data. 
76 The selected contiguously inapplicable states pose a selection bias on the Northeast and South ratings 
considering four states each from the West and Midwest regions were omitted. 
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Arizona, Colorado, Iowa, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Nebraska77, and Wyoming, plus the 
exclusion of noncontiguous states Alaska and Hawaii78. This brought our total population 
to a total of 40 states and 608 observations79. Table 1 explains our process of grouping 
panel data together in ordered categories. For a more an explanation of this process, see 
the Model Specification section. 
Table 1: Dependent Variable Data Classifications and Comparisons 
Rating Agency Quantitative S&P Ordered Aggregated 
S&P Moody's Fitch Value Definition80 Category Observations81 
AAA Aaa AAA 1 
Extremely strong 
capacity to meet 
financial 
commitments 
Prime (1) 125 
AA+ Aa1 AA+ 2 Very strong 
capacity to meet 
financial 
commitments 
High Grade 
(2) 96 
AA Aa2 AA 3 Mid-High Grade (3) 206 
AA- Aa3 AA- 4 
High to 
Medium-
Grade (4) 
181 
A+ A1 A+ 5 Strong capacity to 
meet financial 
commitments, but 
somewhat 
susceptible to 
adverse economic 
conditions. 
A A2 A 6 
A- A3 A- 7 
BBB+ Baa1 BBB+ 8 
Adequate capacity 
to meet financial 
commitments but 
more subject to 
adverse economic 
conditions 
BBB Baa2 BBB 9 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Nebraska was not included because of its unicameral legislature that includes no lower house distinction. 
78 This is the general practice for studies analyzing fiscal conditions in U.S. states (Alt et al. 2002) and it 
does not affect the results associated with political instability terms used in this study. Alaska and Hawaii 
are seen as outliers in many respects because these states depend disproportionally on federal transfers 
(Schelker 2012). 
79 Equations (8) and (11) also exclude California, in addition to the baseline exclusions, due to its outlying 
polarization referenced in Shor (2014). 
80 S&P (2011). 
81 These observation counts represent the total number of calculated median credit ratings in each category 
over period 1992-2010, excluding those ratings from Arizona, Colorado, Iowa, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, 
Nebraska, and Wyoming. 
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Explanatory Variables of Interest. Our three focal explanatory variables attempt 
to capture: a government’s competitiveness, its ideological spread, and its partisan 
preference. We focus our analysis on lower house portion of state legislatures for two out 
of the three variables for three reasons. First, election cycles are fairly consistent82 and 
this makes for a more varying measure (dissimilar to a legislature’s upper house). 
Second, the lower house mirrors our more familiar federal counterpart, Congress, as the 
heart and soul of state democracy. Lastly, the literature shows that U.S. state lower 
houses are rarely used when analyzing the relationship between political gridlock and 
economic stability.  
 
1. Political competitiveness (COMP). We assume a variation of the Ranney index 
measure – a folded Ranney index83  – to measure the frequency at which states change 
partisan control. This folded feature uses the same Ranney index discussed in the 
Literature Review section, but calculates the distance of the Ranney score away from 
“0.5”84 C.E. Klarner claims is the best way to measure a state’s competitiveness (personal 
communication, March 19, 2014). 
 We hypothesize that political competition fuels partisan gridlock by raising the 
stakes on every policy dispute. This leads to an increase in the risk of economic 
instability, on average, in the state where high political competitiveness exists. When 
institutional majorities hang on small political advantages (e.g. avoiding government 
shutdown), party members and leaders are more likely to reject opportunities that grant 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 Term lengths are typically two years except for four states that have a term length of four years 
(Alabama, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi). 
83 Klarner Politics data (Klarner, n.d.). 
84 C.E. Klarner claims this is the best way to measure a state’s competitiveness (personal communication, 
March 19, 2014). 
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political legitimacy to the opposite party, even when the economic stakes are 
insurmountable and the standing option is a viable one. Instead, a competitive political 
environment initiates debilitating political dysfunction and instability and amplifies the 
partisan differences voters perceive between their party and the opposition (Binder and 
Lee 2013). 
 
2. Partisan polarization (POLAR). We construct our measure of polarization in 
the state’s lower house using data from Shor and McCarty (2013). Polarization is 
represented by how far the center (median) of each party85 differs from one another86 87. 
Since a larger divergence equates to increased polarization, we speculate that a larger 
POLAR will lead to a worse credit rating, and thus more economic instability. 
 
3. Partisan control (PART). We implement Ranney data from Klarner (n.d.) to 
construct our partisan control variable. This variable represents the proportion of 
Democrats in control of the state’s lower house legislature in a given year. A score of “1” 
is defined as complete Democratic control and score of “0” is defined as complete 
Republican control.  
On average, Democrats are more permissive, or tolerant, of government 
expenditures than Republicans88. We argue that this leads to an increased risk of default 
on government financial obligations. Assuming this generalization of each party’s fiscal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 Democrats and Republicans. 
86 This is a common measure of legislative polarization (Shor 2014). 
87 See Section II.2 for more information on exactly how this measurement is calculated. 
88 We assume this action outweighs default mitigation by Democrats through enacting policies that raise tax 
revenue. 
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platforms, we hypothesize that an increase in the proportion of Democrats will lead to a 
decrease in the state’s credit rating.  
 
4. Regional indicators (Dummies). The following codes were assigned to each 
state according to the four census regions (Klarner, n.d.): 
SOUTH = 1; 
WEST = 2; 
MIDWEST = 3; 
NORTHEAST = 489. 
  
Structural Explanatory Variables. Unlike Pallay (2014) or Arnett (2014), we 
only include a couple of fiscal control variables to avoid “overfitting” the model and 
ultimately invalidating each estimated effect due to multicollinearity90 (Schelker 2009; 
2012). The literature suggests cases where researchers have employed several variables to 
account for various state economic figures. This is a rather intuitive approach considering 
the economic data is readily available and these figures certainly play a role in the credit 
rating process. However, state economic conditions are also correlated with our political 
measures of interest, and therefore, we decided to leave many of them out91. In order to 
control for differences in rating mechanisms of the three principal rating agencies and 
state-specific covariates, all regressions include two additional explanatory variables. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 The Northeast region indicator variable is omitted to define the reference (or base) group and avoid 
violation of perfectly multicollinear variables (MR5) (a.k.a. the dummy variable trap). 
90 Schelker (2009; 2012). 
91 As economic conditions worsen, political competitiveness and partisan polarization increase, and vice 
versa (Cummins, 2012). 
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1. Per capita income (PCINC). We follow Krueger and Walker (2008) in 
excluding a structural variable that captures changes in employment92. Instead, we 
include a measure of personal income, which we believe serves as a better measure of 
long-term state economic health. Employment primarily captures short-term economic 
fluctuations, which doesn’t match our long-term dependent variable. 
A lower credit rating also equates to a higher borrowing cost to taxpayers. This 
requires a higher interest-rate-premium to account for the increased level of default risk, 
which decreases disposable income, and thus nominal per capita income. In the long-run, 
a fall in personal income will impact consumption levels within a state. Decreased 
consumption will hurt the state’s economy and credit rating. Using a real measure of 
income did not change our empirical findings.  
We again utilize the state economic data provided by Klarner (n.d.) and propose 
nominal per capita income (in $1s) as the first of our two structural variables. A term to 
account for population was not included93, however the per capita measure allows us to 
account for population differences across states, and income carries a nonlinear 
relationship with credit rating, we make the model a partial linear-log function by taking 
PCINC’s natural logarithm. We suggest that a one percent change in income will increase 
the state’s probability of achieving a higher credit rating. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 This decision is going against the grain of many competent studies in the literature where unemployment 
rate is one of the strongest variables (Krueger and Walker 2008).  
93 This is partially due to the fact that NPCI partially accounts for per capita discrepancies across states. 
Schelker (2012) claims that estimating population effects at such an aggregated level may not be 
representative for all classes of jurisdictions. He says that the “optimal size of jurisdictions depends on the 
context and analyzed dimension” 
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2. Debt to gross state product (DEBTGSP). Klarner (n.d.) provides us with our 
second structural variable: a debt to gross state product ratio. Since states take on debt in 
both good and bad markets94, this structural variable will not take away any influence of 
other explanatory variables. It accounts for the differences in each state’s leveraging 
habits, while also controlling for states that produce a lot more than others due to other, 
unspecified variables. 
 Table 2 summarizes statistical characteristics and a description of each variable 
included in our model. 
Table 2: Summary Statistics 
Variable Population Min.–Max. 
Population 
Mean (Std. 
dev.) 
Description 
State credit 
rating (Long-
term GOB) 
RATING 
– – 
Ordinal polychotomous 
variable with four categories of 
aggregated credit ratings from 
S&P, Fitch, and Moody's. 
Per Capita 
Income 
PCINCOME 
$14,651 – 
$56,959 29,675 (7,889) Nominal per capita income 
Debt to Gross 
State Product 
DEBTGSP 
1.59% – 
22.76% 7.43% (3.9182) 
Percentage of total debt 
outstanding to gross state 
product 
State 
Government 
Competitiveness 
COMP 
0.65 – 0.99 0.88 (0.0873) 
Folded Ranney state 
competitiveness score (4 
Years) 
Lower House 
Legislature 
Polarization 
POLAR 
0.45 – 3.21 1.26 (0.4557) 
Shor-McCarty median 
ideological spread in the lower 
house 
Lower House 
Legislature Party 
Control           
PART 
0.23 – 0.92 0.55 (0.1494) Percentage of Democrats in the lower house 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 Krueger and Walker (2008) 
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2. Model Specification 
Our baseline approach follows a simplified nonlinear version of Cheung’s 
censored regression (2008) study of provincial credit ratings. We assume an ordered 
probit model with an ordinal polychotomous dependent variable, 𝑦!", to estimate the max 
likelihood (MLE) of state credit ratings resulting from an latent measure of risk (𝑦!"∗ ), or 
what we call, economic stability. The unobserved economic stability is a linear function 
of explanatory variables 𝓍, with parameter vector 𝛽, and an error term ε, 
 𝑦!"∗ = β′𝓍 + ε. (3) 
The latent dependent variable, 𝑦!"∗ , is characterized by an observed, qualitative and 
ordinal 𝑦!"    using a multinomial probit model. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression 
estimation would misinterpret the differences between each rating because there is a 
nonlinear, unobserved movement from one qualitative rank to another. Instead, we use an 
ordered multinomial probit (OMP), which offers an estimation technique that assumes an 
order. It also assumes that the size of the difference between each ordered rank is not 
known and does not incorporate this into its configuration (as the OLS method would). 
 The OMP model observes our dependent variable, RATING (𝑦!"), a quantitative 
panel of credit ratings for state 𝑖 in year 𝑡. We derive the variable from an aggregated 
qualitative pool of Fitch95, Moody’s96, and S&P GOB ratings, which range from AAA to 
BBB over the years 1992-201097. In order to construct a single-rating measure while 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 Fitch Ratings is roughly one-third the size of both S&P and Moody’s in terms of ratings outstanding 
(White 2013). 
96 Moody’s was the originator of publicly available ratings, an innovation of its founder, John Moody, in 
1909 (White 2013). However, S&P seems to be regarded as the market’s most credible rating agency; 
hence our preference of its ratings in our dependent variable aggregation process. 
97 This implies that the range of 𝑦!" is limited to those ratings assigned to particular states during the years 
in the sample. Therefore, the probability distribution of a rating outside the range of observed ratings (e.g. 
BBB-) cannot be estimated (Cheung 1996). 
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accounting for missing data, we construct panel data using an approach98 similar to 
Depken and LaFountain (2006) and Schelker (2008; 2012). We take the median rating for 
each state 𝑖 in each year 𝑡 (when all three ratings are available), or the S&P rating (when 
only two ratings are available99). Then, we assign this rating to the corresponding state 𝑖 
in year 𝑡 in quantitative form with one and nine being the highest and lowest ratings, 
respectively (i.e. AAA, Aaa = 1; AA+, Aa1 = 2 … BBB, Baa2 = 9). Next, we group these 
ratings into four custom categories of roughly equal proportion100101 to ease estimation 
inference. These groups are: (1) Prime (AAA, Aaa); (2) High Grade (AA+, Aa1); (3) 
Mid-High Grade (AA, Aa2); and (4) Low-High to Medium Grade (AA-, Aa3 to BBB, 
Baa2). Thus, 
 
𝑦!" = 1   Prime          if  𝑦!"∗ ≤ 𝑢!,                = 2   High  Grade  if          𝑢! < 𝑦!"∗ ≤ 𝑢!,               = 3   Mid− High  Grade          if  𝑢! < 𝑦!"∗ ≤ 𝑢!,               = 4   Low− High  to  Medium  Grade          if  𝑢! ≤ 𝑦!"∗ , 
(4) 
where 𝑢’s are unknown cut points that define the boundaries between credit rating 
groups. These parameters are estimated through maximum likelihood in conjunction with 
vector β, given that error ε is normally distributed and that its mean and variance is 
normalized to zero and one.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 This approach, although intuitive and pragmatic, ignores the full information content of the ratings, as 
well as the differences between the rankings of the three different agencies, potentially inducing biases. A 
more accurate but complex approach is mentioned in Section V. 
99 Not all GOBs are always rated by all three rating agencies and, therefore, some observation 
measurements relied on only one or two agencies. This was uncommon for the majority of all states and 
years, but it could not be avoided without magnifying the complexity of the model (Schelker 2012). 
100 See Figures 1 and 2 for observation distributions. 
101 Prime (195 observations); high grade (233); mid-high grade (365); and low-high to medium grade (210). 
See Table 1 for visualization. 
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Where ϕ is the cumulative distribution function of a normal distribution and 
given the probabilities, 
 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 𝑦 = 1 = ϕ(𝑢! − β′𝓍),  𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 𝑦 = 2 = ϕ 𝑢! − β!𝓍 − ϕ(𝑢! − β′𝓍), 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 𝑦 = 3 = ϕ 𝑢! − β!𝓍 − ϕ 𝑢! − β!𝓍 , 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 𝑦 = 4 = 1− ϕ 𝑢! − β!𝓍 , 
(5) 
a maximum likelihood equation (MLE) can be formed to estimate the unknown 𝑢 and β 
parameters: 
 
𝐿 𝑦/𝑥 =   𝑌!! ∗ logϕ(𝑢! − x!′β)!!!!
+ 𝑌!! ∗ log[ϕ 𝑢! − x!′β − ϕ 𝑢!!! − x!′β ] + 𝑌!!!!!!
∗ log[1 − ϕ(𝑢! − x!′β)]    
(6) 
The indicator variable 𝑌!" takes on the value of one if the realization of the kth observation 𝑦! is the ith rating, and zero otherwise. The log-likelihood function stated above is 
maximized using estimated 𝑢’s (cutoff points) and β’s (coefficients).102 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 We agree with Cheung (1996) that this model can also be estimated, just as well, with an ordinary 
ordered logit. 
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Figure 1: Ordered Category Observation Counts (Before Grouping) 
 
 
The model describes probabilities of outcomes and therefore doesn’t directly 
describe the relationship between a 𝑦!" and covariates 𝓍!. Since there are no obvious 
regression relationships at work between the observed random variable and the 
covariates, the effect (β!) of a change in an explanatory variable (𝓍!) on the estimated 
probabilities of the highest and lowest ordered categories is certain. However, the impact 
on the estimated probabilities of intermediate classifications isn’t clear. 
In other words, we know that if coefficient β! is negative, an increase in the 
conditional mean β′𝓍 (by way of an increase in 𝓍!) definitely decreases a state’s 
probability of being in the lowest rating group (AA- to BBB) and definitely increases a 
state’s probability of being in the highest rating group (AAA), but the impact on the 
estimated probabilities of classifying in between (AA+ or AA) can be in either direction. 
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The sum of all changes will remain zero, since the new probabilities must still add up to 
one, and the single-crossing condition applies103. 
Figure 2: Ordered Category Observation Counts (After Grouping) 
 
 Using the variables specified above, we formulate, regress, and estimate the 
following six equations. Each equation attempts to distinguish between our three 
measurements of political stability (partisan competitiveness, polarization, and control) 
with and without regional indicator specification. 
 
 𝑦!"∗ = β! + β!𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃!" + β!  ln(𝑃𝐶𝐼𝑁𝐶!")+ β!𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝐺𝑆𝑃!" + ε!" (7) 
 
 𝑦!"∗ = β! + β!𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐴𝑅!" + β!  ln(𝑃𝐶𝐼𝑁𝐶!")+ β!𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝐺𝑆𝑃!" + ε!" (8) 
 
 𝑦!"∗ = β! + β!𝑃𝐴𝑅𝑇!" + β!  ln(𝑃𝐶𝐼𝑁𝐶!")+ β!𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝐺𝑆𝑃!" + ε!" (9) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 For a variable with a positive coefficient, effects at Prob(1) will be begin as negative, then change to a 
set of positive values, thus changing signs once. See Green and Hensher (2009) for more examination of 
the single-crossing property in ordered probit models. 
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𝑦!"∗ = β! + β!𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃!" + β!  ln(𝑃𝐶𝐼𝑁𝐶!")+ β!𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝐺𝑆𝑃!" + δ!𝑆𝑂𝑈𝑇𝐻+ δ!𝑀𝐼𝐷𝑊𝐸𝑆𝑇 + δ!𝑊𝐸𝑆𝑇 + ε!" (10) 
 
 
𝑦!"∗ = β! + β!𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐴𝑅!" + β!  ln(𝑃𝐶𝐼𝑁𝐶!")+ β!𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝐺𝑆𝑃!" + δ!𝑆𝑂𝑈𝑇𝐻+ δ!𝑀𝐼𝐷𝑊𝐸𝑆𝑇 + δ!𝑊𝐸𝑆𝑇 + ε!" (11) 
 
 
𝑦!"∗ = β! + β!𝑃𝐴𝑅𝑇!" + β!  ln(𝑃𝐶𝐼𝑁𝐶!")+ β!𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝐺𝑆𝑃!" + δ!𝑆𝑂𝑈𝑇𝐻+ δ!𝑀𝐼𝐷𝑊𝐸𝑆𝑇 + δ!𝑊𝐸𝑆𝑇 + ε!" (12) 
 
where 𝑖 is an index of applicable states; 𝑡 is a time index in years, ranging from 1992 to 
2010; 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐺!" is the most recent standing, aggregated credit rating of state 𝑖 in year 𝑡; 𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃!" is the folded Ranney index score of state government 𝑖 in year 𝑡, ranging from 
1992 to 2010; 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐴𝑅!" is the Shor-McCarty AIDD to total polarization ratio 
measurement value for lower house state legislatures in state 𝑖 in year 𝑡, ranging from 
1998 to 2008; 𝑃𝐴𝑅𝑇!" is the proportion of Democratic party control in lower house state 
legislatures in state 𝑖 in year 𝑡, ranging from 1992 to 2010; ln(𝑃𝐶𝐼𝑁𝐶!") is the natural log 
of nominal per capita income for state 𝑖 in year 𝑡, ranging from 1992 to 2010; 𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝐺𝑆𝑃!" is the debt to gross state product for state 𝑖 in year 𝑡, ranging from 1992 to 
2010; 𝑆𝑂𝑈𝑇𝐻, 𝑀𝐼𝐷𝑊𝐸𝑆𝑇, 𝑊𝐸𝑆𝑇 are indicator (dummy) variables that are equal to 1 if 
the indicated state 𝑖 is located in the respective region, and equal to 0 if otherwise; and ε!" 
is assumed to be independently, identically, and normally distributed error terms. 
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IV. INFERENCE AND RESULTS 
 
1. Inference 
Compared to an ordinary regression setting such as OLS, the ordered probit 
model and maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) inference poses a more complicated 
interpretation of the coefficients. Where there is no natural conditional mean function, 𝐸[𝑦|𝑥], to analyze, direct interpretation of the coefficients is fundamentally 
ambiguous104. The marginal effect of a change in the cumulative estimated probability of 
moving toward the top or bottom group, due to a unit change in the relevant explanatory 
variable (𝓍!), isn’t estimated by a  β value. Instead, it’s estimated by the calculated partial 
derivative of the probability expression, 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 𝑦 = i , with respect to 𝓍! (a normal 
density function, ϕ, of parameter β!). For example, the probability of a state achieving 
the High Grade rating is 
 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 𝑦 = 2 = Φ 𝑢! − β!𝓍 −Φ(𝑢! − β′𝓍) (13) 
The marginal effect (𝛿!) of changes in 𝓍! on the probability of having a High Grade (2) 
rating is 
 𝛿!(𝓍!) = 𝜕𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑦 = 2)𝜕𝑥! = (Φ 𝑢! − β!𝓍 −Φ 𝑢! − β!𝓍 )  β! (14) 
where Φ  is the density function of a standard normal distribution105. 
 Obtaining the marginal effects of a dummy variable in an OMP model entails 
using a difference of probabilities, rather than just differentiating as if it were a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104Greene and Hensher (2009). 
105 Cheung (1996). 
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continuous variable106. The latter would result in a finite change computation – a discrete 
approximation to the derivative. Suppose D is a dummy variable in the model 
representing the region where state 𝑖 lies. With all other variables held at their values of 
interest, the appropriate computation measures the effect of a change in D from 0 to 1, 
 ∆! 𝐷 = Φ 𝑢! − β!𝓍! + 𝛾 −Φ 𝑢!!! − β!𝓍! + 𝛾 − Φ 𝑢! − β!𝓍! −Φ 𝑢!!! − β!𝓍! . (15) 
 
2. Results 
We use several different regression models to explore tendencies and potential 
relationships in our analysis. Using panel data, we are able to incorporate the fixed effects 
associated with each state and control for more lurking or unaccounted variables. State 
economic stability is influenced by a number of factors that are independent of partisan 
polarization, such as geography and the weather, so it’s just as likely that the relationship 
between economic and political stability is exactly the opposite. This observation implies 
that political stability may be determined by economic stability (credit ratings), rather 
than vice versa107. 
Table 3: Estimation Results 
Variable Estimate Standard Error t-value Pr(>|t|) 
Sample N  
(states) 
[period] 
Equation (7)      COMP 0.55 0.5308 1.044 0.2964 
608 
 
(32) 
 
[1992-2010] 
log(PCINCOME) -0.97 0.1773 -5.463 0.0000 
DEBTGSP -0.12 0.0127 9.466 0.0000 
Cut Point 1-2 -9.43 1.1824 -5.204 0.0000 
Cut Point 2-3 -0.89 1.8105 -0.492 0.0000 
Cut Point 3-4 -7.96 1.8071 -4.403 0.0000 
 
Equation (8)      
POLAR -0.13 0.1493 -0.858 0.3909 388 
 log(PCINCOME) -0.10 0.2876 -3.405 0.0007 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 Greene and Hensher (2009). 
107 Pallay (2014). For a relevant example, see Bowling and Ferguson (2001). 
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DEBTGSP 0.15 0.0167 9.179 0.0000 (31) 
 
[1998-2008] 
Cut Point 1-2 -9.93 2.9091 -3.414 0.0006 
Cut Point 2-3 -9.25 2.9062 -3.183 0.0015 
Cut Point 3-4 -8.42 2.9022 -2.903 0.0037 
 
Equation (9)      
PART 1.10 0.3069 3.588 0.0003 
608 
 
(32) 
 
[1992-2010] 
log(PCINCOME) -0.09 0.1770 -5.220 0.0000 
DEBTGSP 0.12 0.0129 8.955 0.0000 
Cut Point 1-2 -0.89 1.8053 -4.933 0.0000 
Cut Point 2-3 -0.84 1.8034 -0.465 0.0000 
Cut Point 3-4 -7.41 1.8003 -0.411 0.0000 
 
Equation (10)      
COMP -0.24 0.5520 -0.439 0.6606 
608 
 
(32) 
 
[1992-2010] 
log(PCINCOME) -1.12 0.1835 -6.119 0.0000 
DEBTGSP 0.09 0.0163 5.397 0.0000 
SOUTH -0.66 0.1584 -4.193 0.0000 
WEST 0.17 0.1672 1.032 0.3020 
MIDWEST -0.31 0.1627 -1.931 0.0535 
Cut Point 1-2 -12.29 1.9443 -6.322 0.0000 
Cut Point 2-3 -11.74 1.9410 -6.051 0.0000 
Cut Point 3-4 -10.77 1.9371 -5.558 0.0000 
 
Equation (11)      
POLAR -0.11 0.1536 -0.747 0.4548 
388 
 
(31) 
 
[1998-2008] 
log(PCINCOME) -1.04 0.2999 -3.454 0.0006 
DEBTGSP 0.15 0.0212 6.928 0.0000 
SOUTH -0.15 0.2081 -0.707 0.4797 
WEST -0.02 0.2040 -0.121 0.9033 
MIDWEST 0.00 0.1995 0.009 0.9925 
Cut Point 1-2 -10.59 3.0914 -3.426 0.0006 
Cut Point 2-3 -9.91 3.0874 -3.209 0.0013 
Cut Point 3-4 -9.83 3.0849 -2.945 0.0032 
 
Equation (12)      
PART 1.46 0.3344 4.306 0.000 
608 
 
(32) 
 
[1992-2010] 
log(PCINCOME) -1.10 0.1835 -6.007 0.0000 
DEBTGSP 0.09 0.0161 5.513 0.0000 
SOUTH -0.65 0.1560 -4.152 0.0000 
WEST 0.22 0.1671 1.339 0.1806 
MIDWEST -0.10 0.1671 -0.577 0.5640 
Cut Point 1-2 -11.00 1.9201 -5.731 0.0000 
Cut Point 2-3 -10.45 1.9169 -5.449 0.0000 
Cut Point 3-4 -9.44 1.9137 -4.933 0.0000 
 
 Our findings108 are disappointing considering the evidence provided by some of 
the literature. Equations (7), (8), (10), and (11) provide consistent evidence that both our 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 See Table 4. 
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COMP and POLAR variables don’t hold statistically significant relationships with state 
credit ratings given this particular model specification. This infers that our parameters of 
COMP and POLAR are also most likely assuming the wrong relationship with our 
dependent variable RATING. 
Our t-statistics in Equations (9) and (12) agree109 with Pallay’s (2014) findings, 
which found that a better quality-of-life is analogous with Republican partisan control. 
Our model finds that as the proportion of Democrats decreases, the probability of a state 
reaching the highest credit rating increases. Pallay’s findings also suggest that other, 
untested variables are important drivers of this relationship and that the explanatory 
power of these relationships is very limited given little statistical significance. We agree 
and take our findings with skepticism. Similar to other empirical findings of this 
nature110, our empirical results do not allow a causal interpretation and inference of the 
influence of political gridlock, which is undermined by simultaneity and omitted variable 
biasness. 
   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 We speculate that this statistically significant finding is merely a correlational effect and most likely not 
a true causal relationship given the complexities of biasness surrounding our complete model. 
110 Poterba (1994); Bohn and Inman (1996); Poterba and Rueben (2001); Johnson and Kriz (2005); Depken 
and LaFountain (2006); Schelker (2012); Pallay (2014). 
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V. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
1. Dependent Variable 
Despite the contributions made in this study, the effects of political gridlock on 
state credit ratings, especially in the states, merits considerable further investigation and 
research. There is evidence throughout the literature that the relationship observed in our 
empirical analysis is conclusive and economically significant (Krueger and Walker 
2008). This implies that we took the wrong approach in one or many respects. More 
specifically, a reworking of our dependent variable is imperative in order to obtain 
statically significant results in our focal independent variables. There are several 
advanced methods that can make our dependent variable stronger.  
Krueger and Walker (2008) utilize a unique measure of state bond ratings that 
incorporates Bayesian Marko Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulation to measure its 
latent construct. A simulation procedure is the optimal approach when dealing with a 
dependent variable like state credit ratings and would have been implemented in our 
model if the proper resources were available. Krueger and Walker use censored, or 
“truncated” data, in a tobit model to describe a continuous, yet unobservable, measure of 
economic stability (Θ!"∗ ). The credit rating agency doesn’t explicitly provide Θ!"∗  through 
its ratings, but rather, a latent examination (y!"#∗ ) of an aggregated order of indicators, 
where 𝑏 = {𝐹𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ,𝑀𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑦!𝑠, 𝑆&𝑃} and one rating is closest to the state’s true economic 
stability.  
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To measure Θ!"∗ , we conceptualize the dependent variable 𝑦!"# from an aggregated 𝑏 agencies for state 𝑖 in year 𝑡 is a function of parameters Λ! and underlying economic 
stability Θ!"∗ , 
 𝑦!"# = 𝐹(Λ! ,Θ!"∗ ) (16) 
Each indicator b has its own intercept, 𝛼!, and a particular slope, 𝛽!, relating the changes 
in economic stability, Θ!"∗ , to the probabilities of a specified ordered categories. Defining 𝐹 as a cumulative standard normal distribution (ϕ), and Λ! =    {𝛼! ,𝛽!}, we can assume a 
conventional ordered probit model, 
 y!"#∗ = 𝛼! + 𝛽!Θ!"∗ + ε!"# (17) 
with the requirement that, 
 𝑃𝑟 𝑦!"# = 𝑘! = ϕ 𝛼! , 𝑘! − 𝛽!Θ!"∗ − ϕ(𝛼! , 𝑘!!! − 𝛽!Θ!"∗ ). (18) 
We also assume 𝛼! , 𝑘! = ∞ and 𝛼!,! =   −∞ to ensure proper probabilities for the 
discrete values 𝑘! of 𝑦!"#. Unlike a standard probit model, we are interested in the 
unobserved Θ!"∗ , not simply the latent 𝑦!"#. 
Schelker (2009; 2012) take a different, yet similar approach. They apply Gauss-
Hermite quadrature estimation procedures proposed by Frechette (2001) to random 
effects ordered probit models. Their study claims this is the preferred specification 
technique, as it allows for individual heterogeneity unlike the fixed effects that we 
implement.  
Schelker (2009) also controls for time effects and additional covariates with 
variables that have proven to be influential in previous research at the U.S. state level111. 
Likelihood ratio tests show that the regression model including the time effects fit the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 These variables account for things such as: population density, strict balance budget laws, and initiative 
rights. 
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data significantly better than the basic model without the time effects. This fortifies our 
method of finding structural variables. It proves that taking the time to search for truly 
statically and economically significant structural variables – while still avoiding 
overfitting – can make the model much stronger. 
If we were to form a similar model again, we would also implement a dependent 
lag. Benson and Mark’s (2007) study observes that rating agencies are slow to respond to 
changes in local economic and fiscal conditions. A lag would coordinate data in a 
position where causal effects would be more visible. 
 
2.  Independent Variables 
Shor and McCarty (2011) use an advanced algorithm to strengthen their 
independent variable, which measures polarization. This algorithm works to eliminate 
districts that have a very high or low propensity to elect a Republican within their AIDD 
estimates for state lower houses. This trims their sample and allows them to eliminate 
concerns about including districts that are unlikely to elect a Democrat or Republican. 
The Ranney index is the existing standard measure for political competitiveness, 
but it’s certainly not the best. Most studies that utilize its index are attempting to measure 
the forecasted probability of a change in party control within state government. This is 
much different than what the Ranney index actually measures: the makeup of previous 
partisan coalitions. C. E. Klarner should be coming out with a measure that fixes this 
problem by the August of 2014 (personal communication, March 19, 2014). 
In order to fully utilize the diverse population presented by varying state 
legislatures, we also suggest considering the trends of third party movements and 
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independents to capture both polarization and competitiveness within a state government 
and its lower house. Research by Pew (2012) suggests that the growing partisan divide 
isn’t simply the result of more Americans classifying themselves as independents over 
the last twenty-five years. Independents themselves have migrated toward one party or 
the other. Such analysis of this recent ideological migration could provide more 
constructive evidence for the adverse effects of partisan gridlock.  
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VI. CONCLUSION 
 
We have argued that uncertainty of future fiscal policies due to increased political 
instability, dysfunction, gridlock, competitiveness, and polarization, impose an adverse 
effect on the corresponding economy by increasing the likelihood of economy instability. 
We also demonstrated important steps toward finding statistically and economically 
substantive evidence in support of the view that political instability – through gridlock – 
has an adverse affect on a state’s economic stability and function. 
In summary, we find strong evidence that as more scholarly work is achieved in 
this area, a more conclusive model will arise. As the dialogue grows, we are confident 
that is unambiguous evidence such a relationship is a reality and cause for attention. Even 
if partisan gridlock eases as the country fully recovers from its recent recession, there’s 
still reason to believe such a debilitating political dysfunction could repeat itself in the 
future. 
Washington faces a corrosive hyper-partisanship problem that must be bridged in 
order to face the nation’s greatest challenges (Snowe, 2013). Unfortunately, more than 
half of the Millennial generation112 believes that the government is dysfunctional, 
wasteful, and inefficient. Congress must seek a way to redeem this trust and fortify a 
constructive, functioning system so that it can face the boundless issues that lie ahead. 
Putting aside partisan differences and working toward partisan peace is certainly one step 
in the right direction.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 Up from 31 percent in 2003. 
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